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Evidence: Statutory Presumption of a Decedent's Due
Care Denies Equal Protection to Survivors Sued for
Wrongful Death
A head-on collision between two vehicles killed one driver and
severely injured the other.' The surviving driver brought suit against
the special administrator of the deceased driver's estate,2 alleging
that the decedent's negligence caused the accident. The trustee for
the decedent's heirs3 subsequently initiated a wrongful death action
against the survivor.4 The two actions were consolidated,5 but before
trial the trial court, upon motion by the survivor, ordered the survivor's suit tried first, on the ground that Minnesota's statutory presumption of a decedent's due care' necessitated separate trials. In
addition, the trial court certified the questions presented as "important, uncertain, and doubtful."' The Minnesota Supreme Court
granted discretionary review' of this order and remanded the actions
1. There were also five passengers in the decedent's car. One was killed; the
remaining four were injured. Price v. Amdal, 256 N.W.2d 461, 463 (Minn. 1977).
2. An action for bodily injury or death caused by a decedent's negligence may
be brought against the personal representative of his estate. MINN. STAT. § 573.01
(1976).
3. Upon written petition by the surviving spouse or one of the next of kin, the
court having jurisdiction over a wrongful death action may appoint a trustee to maintain such action. Id. § 573.02(3).
4. At common law, a person's death not only created no cause of action in itself,
it terminated any existing cause of action for personal injuries sustained by the decedent before death. W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TomRS § 126 (4th ed. 1971).
"The result was that it was more profitable for the defendant to kill the plaintiff than
to scratch him. . . ." Id. § 127, at 902. Lord Campbell's Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. 877,
c. 93, was the first legislation to remedy this anomaly by creating a cause of action for
wrongful death. When the Minnesota territorial laws were first codified in 1851, they
included a wrongful death statute. MiN. TERR. REv. STAT. ch. 78, § 3 (1851). For a
history of early Minnesota wrongful death legislation, see Cashman v. Hedberg, 215
Minn. 463, 466-67, 10 N.W.2d 388, 390-91 (1943). Minnesota's current wrongful death
statute provides that when death is caused by the wrongful act or omission of any
person or corporation, a court-appointed trustee may bring an action for damages
proportionate to the pecuniary loss severally suffered by the surviving spouse and next
of kin as a result of the death of their decedent. MIN. STAT. § 573.02 (1976).
5. Upon motion by the special administrator and the trustee for the decedent's
heirs, the trial court approved consolidation of all actions arising out of the collision.
Also included in the order were actions by one of the injured passengers against both
the survivor and the decedent's estate. No objections were raised at that time. See
Price v. Amdal, 256 N.W.2d 461, 463 (Minn. 1977).
6. MINN. STAT. § 602.04 (1976). The text of section 602.04 appears in note 32
infra.
7. Price v. Amdal, 256 N.W.2d 461, 463 (Minn. 1977).
8. An order refusing to consolidate cases for trial is not appealable as of right.
Id. at 462 n.1 (citing MINN. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(d)). The supreme court granted
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for consolidated trial, holding that the statutory presumption was
unconstitutional because it denied equal protection to survivors
against whom wrongful death actions were brought and lacked any
rational basis after enactment of the Minnesota comparative negligence statute Price v. Amdal, 256 N.W.2d 461, 469 (Minn. 1977).
In Minnesota, a wrongful death plaintiff is entitled to a common
law presumption that his decedent was exercising due care for his
own safety at the time of the occurrence that led to his death.'"
"[B]ased upon a law of nature, the universal and insistent instinct
of self-preservation,"" the presumption operates in favor of a wrongful death plaintiff if the defendant claims that the decedent was
contributorily negligent.'"
Originally, the presumption of due care, like other presumptions,
served as a substitute for evidence.' 3 It could be overcome as a matter
discretionary review "in order to consider a troublesome and vexing question." Id.
(citing MINN. R. Cw. App. P. 105).
9. MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1976). The text of the relevant portion of section 604.01
appears in note 56 infra.
10. See, e.g., Bimberg v. Northern Pac. Ry., 217 Minn. 187, 14 N.W.2d 410
(1944); Aubin v. Duluth St. Ry., 169 Minn. 342, 211 N.W. 580 (1926). The common
law presumption has had a rather checkered history. It was rendered largely moot by
TePoel v. Larson, 236 Minn. 482, 53 N.W.2d 468 (1952), discussed at notes 23-29 infra
and accompanying text, and whatever vitality it may have retained in wrongful death
actions was pre-empted in 1957 by the enactment of a statutory presumption, see Act
of Apr. 29, 1957, ch. 949, 1957 Minn. Laws 1704 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 602.04
(1976)); notes 30-32 infra and accompanying text. That the common law presumption
has never finally been laid to rest, however, is evidenced by its resurrection in Price v.
Amdal, 256 N.W.2d 461 (Minn. 1977). See text accompanying notes 67-68 infra.
There has never been a similar presumption in Minnesota for one merely injured
by the negligence of another. See Carson v. Turrish, 140 Minn. 445, 168 N.W. 349
(1918).
11. Gilbert v. City of Tracy, 115 Minn. 443, 444, 132 N.W. 752, 752 (1911).
12. The Price court stated that the common law presumption "applies to a
decedent, whether plaintiff or defendant in a lawsuit." 256 N.W.2d at 463. The basis
for the assertion that the presumption is available to a defendant is uncertain. Apparently, the presumption has never been applied to a wrongful death defendant in Minnesota, and the court's prior descriptions of its scope are susceptible to conflicting
interpretations. CompareKlare v. Peterson, 161 Minn. 16, 18, 200 N.W. 817, 818 (1924)
("We have often held that one who loses his life in an accident is presumed to have
exercised due care for his own safety."), with Aubin v. Duluth St. Ry., 169 Minn. 342,
348, 211 N.W. 580, 583 (1926) (the presumption "may support all or part of the burden
that plaintiff must meet") (emphasis added). Other jurisdictions, however, have addressed the issue explicitly in the context of a wrongful death action against the estate
of one who was also killed in the mishap. Compare Lorenzen v. Continental Baking
Co., 180 Neb. 23, 141 N.W.2d 163 (1966) (common law presumption applies to both
decedents), and Evjen v. Packer City Transit Line, Inc., 9 Wis. 2d 153, 100 N.W.2d
580 (1960) (common law presumption applies to both decedents), with Todd v. Weikle,
36 Md. App. 663, 376 A.2d 104 (1977) (common law presumption applies only in favor
of plaintiff's decedent).
13. See Luce v. Great N. Ry., 203 Minn. 470, 281 N.W. 812 (1938); Aubin v.
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of law only when "the undisputed evidence so conclusively and unmistakenly rebut[ted] the presumption that honest and fair-minded
men could not reasonably draw different conclusions therefrom."' 4 In
all other cases, the jury was instructed in the presumption and
weighed it with the available direct and circumstantial evidence of
the decedent's due care. 5 The presumption could be destroyed, and
the wrongful death plaintiff barred from recovery, if the jury found
by a preponderance of the evidence that the decedent was contributorily negligent.' 6
In Ryan v. MetropolitanLife Insurance Co.,"7 however, the Minnesota Supreme Court departed from the rule that presumptions
should operate as substantive evidence. Addressing the issue of
whether it was proper to instruct a jury in the common law presumption against suicide, the court determined that a presumption should
have no probative weight.'8 It adopted the Thayer-Wigmore view"
that a presumption is a "procedural device" that only shifts the burden of going forward with evidence onto the party against whom it
operates." Failure to satisfy this burden of production mandated a
finding against that party as a matter of law. If the burden was
satisfied, however, the presumption was destroyed, and the issue
went to the jury to be resolved in light of an unaltered allocation of
the burden of persuasion.' In short, the jurors' only proper role was
to draw reasonable inferences from the actual evidence presented at
trial: "[Tihey should not get, ready made from the court, a deduction to which they are authorized to attach independent probative
value. To allow that would be to assign evidentiary value to that
which is not evidence. ' 2
Duluth St. Ry., 169 Minn. 342, 211 N.W. 580 (1926). But see Jasinuk v. Lombard, 189
Minn. 594, 250 N.W. 568 (1933) (presumption of decedent's due care is only an inference permitted from appropriate facts).
14. Gilbert v. City of Tracy, 115 Minn. 443, 444, 132 N.W. 752, 752 (1911); see
Olson v. Northern Pac. Ry., 84 Minn. 258, 87 N.W. 843 (1901) (by implication). In such
a case, the issue of a decedent's contributory negligence would be determined by the
court in favor of the defendant.
15. See Jasinuk v. Lombard, 189 Minn. 594, 250 N.W. 568 (1933).
16. See Aubin v. Duluth St. Ry., 169 Minn. 342, 211 N.W. 580 (1926).
17. 206 Minn. 562, 289 N.W. 557 (1939).
18. See id. at 566-67, 289 N.W. at 559-60.
19. See J. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 339
(1898); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVMENCE § 2491 (3d ed. 1940).
20. But see Thompson, Presumptions and the New Rules of Evidence in
Minnesota, 2 WM. MrrcHuEL L. REv. 167, 174 (1976) (arguing that a portion of the Ryan
opinion suggests, contrary to the Thayer-Wigmore approach, that a presumption could
have the effect of shifting the burden of persuasion in circumstances where the jury
rejected all countervailing evidence as incredible).
21. See 206 Minn. at 568, 289 N.W. at 560.
22. Id. at 569, 289 N.W. at 560-61.
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The Ryan court's altered conception of presumptions was applied to the presumption of a decedent's due care in TePoel v.
Larson. 3 In TePoel the court reasoned that if the function of a presumption was to shift the burden of production, the presumption of
a decedent's due care had no purpose in a wrongful death action since
the defendant already had the burdens of both production and persuasion on the issue of decedent's contributory negligence.2 4 Thus, a
jury instruction on a decedent's due care could be justified only if the
presumption were evidence or if more than a preponderance of the
evidence were necessary to establish contributory negligence.2 But
both of these theories had been repudiated by the court, the former
in Ryan2 and the latter in earlier cases holding that, even when a jury
is instructed in the presumption of due care, the defendant's required
quantum of proof should remain the same." Thus, although the presumption was not explicitly abolished by TePoel, it was found unnecessary for the protection of wrongful death plaintiffs and inappropriate as a jury instruction.28 As a practical matter, therefore, no
23. 236 Minn. 482, 53 N.W.2d 468 (1952).
24. See, e.g., Aubin v. Duluth St. Ry., 169 Minn. 342, 348, 211 N.W. 580, 583
(1926); McMahon v. Flynn, 154 Minn. 326, 330, 191 N.W. 902, 904 (1923).
In jurisdictions where a wrongful death plaintiff has the burdens of production and
persuasion on the issue of the decedent's due care, the presumption remains valuable,
for it aids the plaintiff in making his prima facie case. In Iowa, for example, wrongful
death plaintiffs were formerly required to plead and prove decedents' lack of contributory negligence. See Ames v. Waterloo Transit Co., 120 Iowa 640, 95 N.W. 161 (1903).
Iowa employed a common law presumption of a decedent's due care, applicable when
there were neither eyewitnesses nor any other evidence to establish what the decedent
actually did during, or immediately preceding, the occurrence that caused his death.
See, e.g., Hoffman v. Monroe Welding Supply Co., 253 Iowa 591, 113 N.W.2d 237
(1962). The Iowa Supreme Court recognized that the presumption was related to the
placement of the burden of proof on the question of the decedent's negligence, see
Rickabaugh v. Wabash Ry., 242 Iowa 746, 749, 44 N.W.2d 659, 661 (1950), and when
the legislature shifted this burden to the defendant, see Act of Apr. 19, 1965, ch. 430,
1965 Iowa Acts 810 (codified at IowA CODE § 619.17 (1977)), the court abolished the
presumption, reasoning that, because the defendant now carried the burden of proof,
retention of the presumption would "really [afford] plaintiff two presumptions."
Froman v. Perrin, 213 N.W.2d 684, 687 (Iowa 1973) (emphasis in original).
It is believed that the presumption of a decedent's due care originated in jurisdictions where the burden of proving the decedent's due care was on the plaintiff. See 2
F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, TORTS § 22.11 (1956); Falknor, Notes on Presumptions, 15
WASH. L. REv. & ST. B.J. 71, 76 (1940).

25. 236 Minn. at 491, 53 N.W.2d at 473. By suggesting this second alternative,
the court implicitly recognized that a jury instruction in the presumption has the
practical effect of increasing the burden of persuasion for the party against whom the
presumption operates. Accord, Falknor, supra note 24, at 77 n.21, 82.
26. See text accompanying notes 17-22 supra.
27. See Duff v. Bemidji Motor Serv. Co., 210 Minn. 456, 462, 299 N.W. 196, 199
(1941); Aubin v. Duluth St. Ry., 169 Minn. 432, 438, 211 N.W. 580, 582 (1926).
28. See 236 Minn. at 491-93, 53 N.W.2d at 473-74.
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circumstances remained in which it could have any effect. 9
Five years later, in apparent response to the TePoel decision,"
the Minnesota Legislature enacted section 602.04 of the Minnesota
Statutes,3 ' creating a statutory presumption of decedents' due care
applicable only in wrongful death actions and requiring a jury instruction in the presumption. 2 Under the statute, the jury was to
determine, apparently in every case, whether the defendant's evidence rebutted the presumption, although the quantum of evidence
necessary to do so was not specified.
The new statutory presumption created a number of interpretive
problems. In Roeck v. Halvorson,3l the Minnesota Supreme Court
ruled that the statute did not preclude a trial court from finding that
the presumption was rebutted as a matter of law. 4 But there remained the more vexing question of whether in all other cases the
presumption was to be given evidentiary effect by the jury. Until
recently, commentators and the court itself thought that the legislature had intended to restore to the presumption a pre-Ryan evidentiary effect. 5 This view was repudiated, however, in Steinhaus v.
Adamson. 6 The Steinhaus court reasoned that to give evidentiary
29. Subsequent decisions continued to refer to a presumption of the decedent's
due care, but, citing TePoel, refused to permit it to be the subject of a jury instruction.
See Lynghaug v. Payne, 247 Minn. 186, 197, 76 N.W.2d 660, 667 (1956); Knuth v.
Murphy, 237 Minn. 225, 232, 54 N.W.2d 771, 776 (1952). Nor did the court ever
intimate thereafter that the presumption had any other proper role. It was thus a
''presumption" in name only.
30. See Price v. Amdal, 256 N.W.2d 461, 464 (Minn. 1977) (Section 602.04 was
enacted "for the apparent purpose of preventing restrictions on a decedent's right to
the presumption of due care in a wrongful death action where the slightest evidence
of his contributory negligence would bar any chance of recovery."); Roeck v. Halvorson, 254 Minn. 394, 399, 95 N.W.2d 172, 176 (1959).
31. Act of Apr. 29, 1957, ch. 949, 1957 Minn. Laws 1704 (codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 602.04 (1976)).
32. MINN. STAT. § 602.04 (1976) provides,
In any action to recover damages for negligently causing the death of a
person, it shall be presumed that any person whose death resulted from the
occurrence giving rise to the action was, at the time of the commission of the
alleged negligent act or acts, in the exercise of due care for his own safety.
The jury shall be instructed of the existence of such presumption, and shall
determine whether the presumption is rebutted by the evidence in the action.
33. 254 Minn. 394, 95 N.W.2d 172 (1959).
34. See id. at 400, 95 N.W.2d at 177 (to construe section 602.04 as preventing a
finding that the presumption had been rebutted as a matter of law would be an
unconstitutional deprivation of judicial power).
35. See Lambach v. Northwestern Ref. Co., 261 Minn. 115, 128, 111 N.W.2d 345,
353-54 (1961) (Dell, C.J., concurring specially); Roeck v. Halvorson, 254 Minn. 394,
399, 95 N.W.2d 172, 176 (1959); Thompson, supra note 20, at 184; Comment,
Evidence-Presumptions-StatutoryPresumptions of Due Care in Wrongful Death
Actions, 60 MICH. L. REv. 510, 515 (1962).
36. 294 Minn. 387, 201 N.W.2d 264 (1972).
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effect to the statutory presumption would be inconsistent with Roeck
because it would render it "difficult to see how a court [could] ever
find as a matter of law that there [was] no evidence justifying recovery.'"' Thus, except for its continuing effect as a jury instruction, the
statutory presumption was reduced to a status comparable to that of
the common law presumption after Ryan and TePoel. Stripped of
procedural effect by the fact that the burden of production on the
issue of contributory negligence rested on the defendant" and of evidentiary effect by Steinhaus, the remaining vitality and purpose of
39
the presumption were in doubt.
Not only were the benefits conferred by the statutory presumption questionable, but its implementation produced serious problems
of both procedural efficiency and fairness to litigants. Wrongful death
actions frequently arise out of events that also give rise to survivors'
negligence actions. Considerations of convenience and judicial economy dictate that because of shared questions of law and fact such
actions be consolidated for trial." Under section 602.04, however,
decedents' representatives were entitled to the benefit of the pre-'
sumption only in wrongful death actions, not as defendants in survivors' actions." Consequently, it proved impossible to formulate jury
instructions that simultaneously stated the law accurately and made
comprehensible to a jury the subtle distinctions that the statutory
presumption would demand in a consolidated trial." Because of this
37. Id. at 395, 201 N.W.2d at 270. The court stated, "All the statute did was to
require the trial court to inform the jury that there was such a presumption and let
the jury decide if it had been rebutted ....
[Ihf they find facts that will rebut the
presumption, it has no further place in the case." Id. at 395-96, 201 N.W.2d at 270
(footnote omitted).
38. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
39.

Embodied in a jury instruction, the presumption still might have had the

indirect effect, implicitly recognized in TePoel, of raising the survivor's burden of
persuasion on the issue of the decedent's contributory negligence. See note 25 supra.
40. MINN. R. Civ. P. 42.01 provides,
When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before
the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in
issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may
make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
41. The text of section 602.04 appears in note 32 supra.
42. The presumption of due care of a decedent rests on the theory that
the love of life ordinarily will cause a person to exercise due care for his own
safety. How is any jury of lay people going to understand that a decedent
has such a love of life as to exercise due care when his trustee sues to recover
for his death but that he did not have the same love of life when the representative of his estate is sued for his negligence?
Lambach v. Northwestern Ref. Co., 261 Minn. 115, 125, 111 N.W.2d 345, 351 (1961)
(Knutson, J., concurring specially); see Steinhaus v. Adamson, 294 Minn. 387,393, 201
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dilemma, the Minnesota Supreme Court denied consolidation of
wrongful death and
survivors' negligence actions arising out of the
4 3
same occurrence.

Separating the trials of these related actions eliminated the confusion of differing jury instructions, but it raised serious questions of
fairness when the doctrine of collateral estoppel was applied in the
second suit. If the survivor's negligence action was tried after the
wrongful death action, the survivor was collaterally estopped from
relitigating the issue of the decedent's negligence even though the
decedent had been afforded a presumption in the prior suit." The
survivor, therefore, could never litigate the question of the decedent's
negligence free from the shadow of the presumption. 5 In contrast, if
the survivor's suit was litigated first, the wrongful death plaintiff in
the subsequent action was unencumbered by collateral estoppel because he was neither a party to, nor in privity with a party in, the
previous action." Recovery for the survivor, therefore, might depend
N.W.2d 264, 269 (1972)("How can a jury ever understand such legal legerdemain?").
On the inherent difficulty of instructing a jury in the terms of any presumption,
see 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 19, § 2498a; Falknor, supra note 24, at 82 ("[Tlhere is
...difficulty [in] conveying to the jury in simple, accurate and understandable
language the nature of a 'presumption', how long it persists and how much evidence
it takes to overcome it."); McCormick, What Shall the Trial Judge Tell the Jury About
Presumptions?, 13 WASH. L. Rav. & ST. B.J. 185, 189 (1938) ("The baffling nature of
the presumption as a tool for the art of thinking bewilders one who searches for a form
of phrasing with which to present the notion to a jury.").
43. See Lustik v. Rankila, 269 Minn. 515, 131 N.W.2d 741 (1964); Lambach v.
Northwestern Ref. Co., 261 Minn. 115, 125-26, 111 N.W.2d 345, 351-52 (1961) (Knutson, J., concurring specially).
44. See Lustik v. Rankila, 269 Minn. 515, 131 N.W.2d 741 (1964) (survivor estopped from asserting negligence claim against decedent's estate by finding in prior
wrongful death action that decedent was free from contributory negligence).
45. Id. at 528, 131 N.W.2d at 749 (Gallagher, J., dissenting).
46. See Schwalich v. Guenther, 282 Minn. 504, 166 N.W.2d 74 (1969); Lustik v.
Rankila, 269 Minn. 515, 131 N.W.2d 741 (1964); cf. Olson v. Linster, 259 Minn. 189,
107 N.W.2d 49 (1960) (prior unfavorable verdict in action by trustee for decedent's heir
not binding in subsequent suit involving identical issue brought by trustee as an
individual); Schmitt v. Emery, 215 Minn. 288, 9 N.W.2d 777 (1943) (prior unfavorable
verdict in action by plaintiff as an individual not binding in subsequent suit involving
identical issues brought by plaintiff as a personal representative where second suit was
not solely for plaintiff's benefit). Collateral estoppel cannot be invoked in a subsequent
action against one not a party to the previous suit, or against one who appeared in a
different capacity. It can, however, be invoked against the unsuccessful party in a
previous action by one not himself a party to that action. See, e.g., Lustik v. Rankila,
269 Minn. 515, 131 N.W.2d 741 (1964). See generallyF. JAMEs, CiviL PRocEDuRE § 11.31
(1965). Because the wrongful death plaintiff is a trustee for the decedent's heirs, MINN.
STAT. § 573.02(3) (1976), whereas the defendant in a survivor's negligence action is the
decedent's personal representative, id. § 573.01, neither is bound by a prior unfavorable verdict against the other. This result is justified by the potentially divergent
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upon the order in which the two actions came to trial. The result was
an unseemly "race to the courthouse" to obtain the potentially decisive priority. 7
Confronted yet again with problems engendered by the statutory
presumption after twenty years of attempts to make the presumption
workable and fair, the court in Price v. Amdal4 s opted for a solution
that offered finality. Although neither party raised the issue,49 the
court found that the statutory presumption of a decedent's due care
denied equal protection to survivor-defendants in wrongful death actions." The validity of the court's equal protection analysis depends
upon the degree to which the distinctions between decedents and
survivors that the court identified are accurate, substantial, and attributable to the presumption and upon the soundness of the court's
conclusion that there was no minimum rational basis upon which the
legislature could rest such distinctions.
The court found that the statutory presumption discriminated
against survivors in two ways. First, despite the legislature's intent
that the presumption apply only in wrongful death actions,51 the
interests of these two representatives. See, e.g., Winona Nat'l & Sav. Bank v. Dahlen
Transp. Co., 256 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1977), discussed at note 55 infra.
47. Although the court recognized this effect, it reluctantly sanctioned the practice as preferable to consolidation. See Lustik v. Rankila, 269 Minn. 515, 517, 131
N.W.2d 741, 743 (1964); Lambach v. Northwestern Ref. Co., 261 Minn. 115, 125, 111
N.W.2d 345, 352 (1961) (Knutson, J., concurring specially).
48. 256 N.W.2d 461 (Minn. 1977).
49. The only constitutional issue advanced by the parties was raised in the respondent's argument that the court should find the statutory presumption an unconstitutional deprivation of judicial power. See Brief for Respondent at 6, Price v. Amdal,
256 N.W.2d 461 (Minn. 1977). See generally Roeck v. H9Ivorson, 254 Minn. 394, 400,
95 N.W.2d 172, 177 (1959); note 34 supra.
50. 256 N.W.2d at 469. The court also observed that the statutory presumption
was overbroad "in that it is inclusive of decedents who are negligent, as demonstrated
by the evidence, as well as those who are not negligent at all." Id. This statement is
puzzling. Surely the court did not mean to suggest that before a presumption may
operate in favor of a party, he must demonstrate that the evidence establishes the fact
to be presumed. Such a requirement would destroy the concept of a presumption
altogether. Nor could the court have meant that the statute absolutely insulated decedents from a finding of negligence. This would have been the case only if section 602.04
had established an irrebuttable presumption of due care. But see notes 33-34 supra and
accompanying text.
51. See 256 N.W.2d at 467; MINN. STAT. § 602.04 (1976). The statute's legislative
history is, unfortunately, of no help in determining legislative intent. Section 602.04
was enacted without amendment and apparently without controversy. Introduced on
March 29, 1957, as S.F. 1672, it was signed into law on April 29, 1957, after passing
unanimously in the Senate, JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, 60TH MINN. LEGIS., 1957 SESS.
2597, and by a vote of 90-11 in the House, JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE, 60th MINN. LEGIS.,
1957 SEss. 2687. Because no substantive legislative history exists, legislative intent can
be inferred only from the wording of the statute itself and from prior court decisions.
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presumption "infect[ed]" the survivor's cause of action and thus
unfairly prejudiced those survivors whose suits were not tried first.52
Since this injustice was caused by application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, 53 however, there is difficulty with attributing the
inequity to the statute. Giving prior wrongful death judgments collateral estoppel effect in survivors' suits was not mandated by section
602.04, but by the court itself in Lustik v. Rankila 4 If the court found
that application of collateral estoppel produced unjust results, it
should have overruled Lustik, rather than declaring the statute unconstitutional.52. 256 N.W.2d at 466-67.
53. See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text.
54. 269 Minn. 515, 131 N.W.2d 741 (1964). The dissenters in Lustik argued
against application of collateral estoppel precisely because it would produce inequitable results. See id. at 528-29, 131 N.W.2d at 749 (Gallagher, J., dissenting) (collateral
estoppel should not be invoked against a party where evidentiary rules were "stacked"
against him in prior adjudication of liability); id. at 529, 131 N.W.2d at 750 (Sheran,
J., dissenting)(collateral estoppel should not bar subsequent survivor's suit "when the
[prior] adverse determination was reached, or possibly reached, because of a principle
of law applicable only because the plaintiff in the prior action [was] given preferential
treatment by reason of our statute").
55. The indirect effect of section 602.04 was to raise the defendant's burden of
persuasion on the issue of the decedent's contributory negligence. See note 25 supra.
As a general rule, when a party has a "significantly heavier" burden of persuasion on
an issue in a prior action, collateral estoppel should not be invoked to prevent relitigation of that issue in a subsequent action. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §
68.1(d)(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977). Moreover, the Minnesota court has recognized elsewhere that, as an equitable doctrine, collateral estoppel should not be used where it
will work an injustice. See Winona Nat'l & Say. Bank v. Dahlen Transp. Co., 256
N.W.2d 469 (Minn. 1977); Lundeen v. Hackbarth, 285 Minn. 7, 171 N.W.2d 87 (1969).
For example, in Dahlen, decided the same day as Price, one woman was killed and
another, her passenger, was injured in an automobile accident. The personal representative of the decedent's estate negotiated a settlement under which the passenger
agreed to indemnify the estate from any claims arising out of subsequent suits by the
passenger against third parties. He therefore had no incentive to offer a defense when
subsequently impleaded as third party defendant in a negligence action brought by the
passenger against the driver of the other automobile. Perhaps as a result, the jury
determined that the decedent had been 65% negligent. The supreme court, however,
refused to collaterally estop the trustee for the decedent's heirs from relitigating the
question of the decedent's negligence in a subsequent wrongful death action brought
against the other driver. Ironically, the court reasoned that, notwithstanding its decision in Price, collateral estoppel should not be applied against the trustee because of
the court's "prior holdings" that consolidation of wrongful death and negligence actions was prohibited:
Surely, were consolidation. . . permissible when the passenger's action was
commenced, every effort would have been made by the trustee to persuade
the jury to find decedent's causal negligence proportionately less than that
of the surviving driver. But such advocacy never occurred. . . . To now hold
that the trustee is collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of decedent's causal negligence .

256 N.W.2d at 472.

would be ..

inequitable ..

..
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Second, the court found that, in wrongful death actions themselves, the statutory presumption discriminated against survivors
because it led juries to attribute to them greater percentages of negligence than were warranted by the evidence. 6 Apparently the court
believed that informing the jury of the presumption altered the process by which the jury allocated negligence so as to alter the balance
of percentages in favor of the decedent to a greater extent than the
evidence alone warranted.
Perhaps the presumption does produce this result. In theory,
however, the jury follows a two-step process in allocating percentages
of negligence. The question of apportionment arises only after the
jury has decided whether each party was negligent. 57 The presumption of a decedent's due care is relevant only to the existence of
negligence, " and when the jury determines that 'a decedent did not,
in fact, exercise due care, it finds, in effect, that the presumption was
unwarranted. One must question the contention that the jury, having
rejected the presumption in finding the decedent negligent, will resurrect it when considering the apportionment issue. In short, there is
little to suggest that an instruction in the presumption will in any
way affect the allocation of negligence.
Nevertheless, it is notoriously difficult to determine the thought
processes of a jury, and it is possible that the presumption causes the
percentages of negligence to be skewed in favor of the wrongful death
plaintiff. Even if this is true, however, it is not the statute itself that
produces this effect, but imprecise or ineffective jury instructions.
56. See 256 N.W.2d at 468. Apportionment of negligence between the parties is
required by MINN. STAT. § 604.01(1) (1976):
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or
his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death
or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the
negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages
allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person recovering.
57. See Ferguson v. Northern States Power Co., 307 Minn. 26, 37, 239 N.W.2d
190, 196 (1976).
58. It is here that the presumption will in fact have an effect. For instance,
suppose the defendant alleged that at the time of the accident the decedent was driving
in the wrong lane. The jury must, first of all, determine whether that allegation is true
and whether under the circumstances that fact constitutes negligence. In this inquiry,
the instruction that decedent is presumed to have been in the exercise of due care may
well tend to make it more difficult for the survivor to convince the jury that his
allegation is true. See note 25 supra. But once the allegation has been accepted as true,
the jury is unlikely to give the presumption any continuing effect, for by its conclusion
on the initial question, the jury has already found that decedent was not exercising
due care. Thus, if the jury understands its general function, there is little reason to
think that it will carry the presumption over into the allocation stage of its deliberations.
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For this defect, remedies less drastic than declaring the statute unconstitutional could have been fashioned.
Having found that the statute had a discriminatory effect, the
court proceeded to find that no rational basis existed for perpetuation
of this unequal treatment." The court recognized that, when originally enacted, the presumption served the rational purpose of ameliorating the harsh effects of the contributory negligence doctrine,"0 but
it felt that, even under the loose standards of a minimal scrutiny
equal protection analysis,6 the enactment of the comparative negli59. The reasons commonly advanced for the creation of a presumption are discussed in C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 343 (2d ed. 1972). A presumption may be employed to assist a favored contention or handicap a disfavored one. The Price court
suggested that this was the original basis for the presumption of a decedent's due care.
See notes 60-63 infra and accompanying text. A presumption may also be used to
correct an imbalance resulting from one party's superior access to proof. For discussion
of that purpose as it relates to the presumption of due care, see text following note 64
infra. A third reason, recognition of a probability inherent in certain factual combinations, was properly rejected by the court. See note 64 infra. A fourth reason, the
avoidance of an impasse, has no application to the presumption of a decedent's due
care.
60. 256 N.W.2d at 469; accord, Simpson v. Anderson, 33 Colo. App. 134, 136, 517
P.2d 416, 417 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 186 Colo. 163, 526 P.2d 298 (1974).
Simpson found that the purpose of the common law presumption of a decedent's due
care was primarily to ameliorate the harshness of the contributory negligence defense
in a wrongful death action where the decedent was unable to testify in his own behalf.
Since, under comparative negligence, wrongful death plaintiffs representing negligent
decedents were no longer automatically barred from recovery, the court ruled that the
presumption should be abolished. Simpson is the only case, other than Price, explicitly
to consider the merits of retaining the presumption of a decedent's due care in light of
the doctrine of comparative negligence.
61. The court recognized that the class distinctions created by the statutory
presumption involved neither "fundamental rights" nor "suspect criteria." 256
N.W.2d at 469 n.7. Thus, only a minimal scrutiny of the statute was warranted, and
it should have been upheld if it served any rational purpose. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled, in interpreting the Federal Constitution, that under
a minimal scrutiny analysis a statute does not deny equal protection merely because
its classifications are imperfect. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972). So long as
the distinctions the statute creates have some basis in practical experience or advance
some legitimate state interest, they must be respected. See McGinnis v. Royster, 410
U.S. 263, 276 (1973). Under the rationality test, a legislative classification normally is
not set aside if any set of facts rationally justifying it is demonstrated, see United
States v. Maryland Sav.-Share Ins. Corp., 400 U.S. 4, 6 (1970), or can be conceived,
see Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 364 (1971); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
426 (1961).
The Price court did not indicate whether it was applying a state or federal constitutional standard. The Minnesota court, however, has previously held that the standards of equal protection under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution are identical to the standards mandated by article I, section 2, and article
IV, sections 33 and 34, of the Minnesota Constitution. See Minneapolis Fed'n of Teach-
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gence statute" had deprived the presumption of any claim to rationality 3 by allowing a wrongful death plaintiff to recover so long as his
decedent's own negligence was not as great as that of the defendant.Y
The court did not consider, however, an alternative purpose
served by the presumption that may provide a rational basis sufficient to survive minimal scrutiny. The legislature may rationally
have sought to correct the evidentiary imbalance in wrongful death
actions that arises because the decedent is unavailable. This unavailability can hamper both the preparation and the presentation of the
plaintiff's case. If the decedent had survived the occurrence that
caused his death and had brought suit for personal injuries, he would
have been a valuable witness in his own behalf. In comparison to the
survivor, therefore, the wrongful death plaintiff is disadvantaged in
his ability to marshall evidence, particularly in cases where the survivor is the only eyewitness to the occurrence. The significance of this
imbalance will vary from case to case, but the fact that one of the
parties is dead creates a differential access to evidence that can never
be fully corrected.
The comparative negligence statute did nothing to correct this
imbalance and therefore did nothing to destroy it as a rational basis
for section 602.04. Whether a statutory presumption was the best
remedy for this imbalance is immaterial for purposes of a minimal
ers Local 59 v. Obermeyer, 275 Minn. 347, 147 N.W.2d 358 (1966). It has also recognized that minimal scrutiny is not a particularly exacting standard: "In the matter of
classification courts have viewed the action of the legislature with great liberality.
Courts are not to weigh the merits of a classification in the judicial balance and to
reject it merely because they might favor a different standard." Id. at 354, 147 N.W.2d
at 363-64. Price itself contained the statement that "courts should not interfere (with
legislative choices] in the absence of palpable error." 256 N.W.2d at 468.
62. The text of the relevant portion of section 604.01 appears in note 56 supra.
63. While we have in the past found that the statute was reasonable in light
of our former law of contributory negligence, we cannot find a rational basis
for its existence when we view its operation in conjunction with the law of
comparative negligence which . . . allows the [wrongful death plaintiff] to
recover even though there may be negligence on the part of the decedent.
256 N.W.2d at 469.
64. The court alluded to, but rejected, another possible basis for the statutory
presumption-recognition of a probability inherent in a certain factual combination.
The court's summary treatment of this possibility was appropriate. If the basis of the
statutory presumption was a supposed inherent probability that those who die in
accidents are more likely to have been exercising due care than those who survive, the
presumption could hardly be found rational. As the court noted, "[tlo find a love of
life only in [sic] the part of the decedent in a wrongful-death suit but not by the
survivor defies logic and reason." 256 N.W.2d at 469. Although there may be a human
instinct of self-preservation in a life-threatening situation, there is no reason to suppose
that decedents possess it to a greater extent than do survivors. Moreover, the fact of a
decedent's quantitatively greater misfortune is irrelevant to the probability that his
negligence caused the accident.
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scrutiny equal protection analysis." Since the statutory presumption
had a rational basis, it should not have been voided as a denial of
equal protection to survivors.
Nevertheless, the statutory presumption was abolished by
Price.66 Somewhat paradoxically, however, the court went on to state,
in dictum, that "[w]here applicable, the common-law presumption
shall be applied in lawsuits tried in Minnesota after the issuance date
of this opinion. 6' 7 In another wrongful death opinion issued the same
day, the court asserted, again in dictum, that Pricehad "restored the
common-law presumption of a decedent's due care to its former and
traditional procedural status."68
Although Price clearly did give the common law presumption a
renewed vitality, it is unclear what purpose the court expected the
presumption to serve and how it was better suited to that end than
the statutory presumption that had just been declared unconstitutional. The holding of TePoel v. Larson,9 that it is improper to instruct the jury in the common law presumption, presumably remains good law?0 Moreover, Rule 301 of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence7' adopted the Ryan-TePoel conception of a presumption as a
mere procedural device 2 for shifting the burden of production onto
the opponent of the party who receives its benefit.7 3 Thus, the common law presumption can have no substantive effect because it cannot be communicated to the jury. Moreover, it can have no procedural effect because the burdens of production and persuasion already rest on the survivor.
The only remaining possibility is that the court was attempting
65. See Minneapolis Fed'n of Teachers Local 59 v. Obermeyer, 275 Minn. 347,
147 N.W.2d 358 (1966); note 61 supra.
66. See 256 N.W.2d at 469.
67. Id.
68. Winona Nat'l & Sav. Bank v. Dahlen Transp. Co., 256 N.W.2d 469, 472
(Minn. 1977).
69. 236 Minn. 482, 53 N.W.2d 468 (1952).
70. See notes 23-29 supra and accompanying text.
71. MINN. R. EvID. 301 provides,
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by statute
or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is
directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the
presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense
of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the
party on whom it was originally cast.
72. See id., Comment.
73. See notes 17-22 supra and accompanying text. The statutory presumption of
a decedent's due care, MINN. STAT. § 602.04 (1976), was recognized as an exception to
Rule 301 because the legislature, by mandating a jury instruction in the presumption,
had specifically provided that it should have more than a merely procedural effect. See
MINN. R. EVID. 301, Comment.
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to acknowledge and effectuate the policy considerations that had
supported the statutory presumption: compensation of wrongful
death plaintiffs for the testimonial advantage gained by survivors
because of the decedent's absence.74 If this was the goal, however,
simply increasing the survivor's burden of persuasion would have
been easier, more intelligible, and more likely to effectuate that goal
in a consistent and reasoned manner.
There are difficulties with this approach, however. Given its rationale, the higher burden of persuasion should be imposed, if at all,
only when the circumstances indicate that the plaintiff will be significantly disadvantaged by the absence of the decedent. 75 But this
would introduce a new and unsettling element of subjectivity as to
when the higher burden should be imposed. Moreover, such a solution does little to solve the problems that have traditionally surrounded the presumption.
Consolidation would be impossible, for the jury would be required to deal with the issue of a decedent's negligence under two
different standards depending upon which party's claim it was considering. Thus, the survivor would inevitably be compelled to endure
two separate trials, taxing both his resources and those of the judicial
system. Moreover, if the doctrine of collateral estoppel were applied
to subsequent suits, another undesirable characteristic of the statu7
tory presumption would be reproduced. 1
An alternative to this approach, which would accord the law's
favor to decedents and their representatives and still permit consolidated trials, would be to impose a higher burden of persuasion on
survivors in both wrongful death and survivors' negligence actions.
Since decedents would be unavailable as witnesses in both cases, the
policy of compensation for evidentiary disadvantage could conceiv74. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 59, § 345; Falknor, supra note 24, at 81-82.
No court that has abolished the presumption of a decedent's due care has believed it
necessary to fill the void by increasing the defendant's burden of persuasion on the
issue of the decedent's contributory negligence. See Froman v. Perrin, 213 N.W.2d 684
(Iowa 1973); Jurman v. Samuel Braen, Inc., 47 N.J. 586, 222 A.2d 78 (1966). In Hutton
v. Martin, 41 Wash. 2d 780, 790, 252 P.2d 581, 587 (1953), the court stated that "Itihe
rule that no person is presumed to have been negligent until the party having the
burden of proof establishes that fact by a preponderance of the evidence furnishes
adequate protection to a deceased person as well as to a living person."
75. If there are disinterested eyewitnesses to the occurrence, the decedent's unavailability would probably not put the wrongful death plaintiff at a significant disadvantage. Similarly, when circumstantial evidence relating to the occurrence is strong
enough conclusively to demonstrate due care or the lack thereof, the defendant's testimonial advantage might be irrelevant.
76. In such circumstances relitigation of the issue of the decedent's negligence
should be permitted. Although the survivor might not have been able to prove the
decedent's negligence by "clear and convincing" evidence, the facts might support a
finding of negligence by a preponderance of the evidence in the subsequent suit. See
note 55 supra.
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ably be extended to justify this alternative. But such a rule ignores
the inequity involved in requiring the survivor to sustain a higher
burden of persuasion in an action to recover for his own injuries
merely because the person who is alleged to have caused those injuries is unavailable. Considerations of fairness require that the same
burden of persuasion apply equally to all personal injury plaintiffs.
Thus, the Minnesota court would be ill-advised to impose a
heavier burden of persuasion on survivors in either case. Of course,
wrongful death plaintiffs will thereby remain somewhat disadvantaged by the unavailability of decedents. But existing safeguards will
help to minimize this effect. The allocation of the burden of proof
itself affords some protection to the wrongful death plaintiff, for if the
survivor cannot make out a prima facie case of the decedent's negligence, the plaintiff is entitled to a directed verdict on that issue. It
is only when the survivor does make out a prima facie case and there
is an absence of conclusive evidence that the decedent was negligent
that decedent unavailability becomes a problem of significant magnitude. Even then, however, the trial process adequately safeguards the
wrongful death plaintiff. Techniques of impeachment can be used to
undermine the credibility of witnesses and to demonstrate impairments of perception and memory; sincerity can be probed through an
examination of bias, interest, and improper motive; and the jury can
judge for itself the demeanor and attitudes of testifying witnesses.
Moreover, the attorney for a wrongful death plaintiff can remind the
jury that the decedent is unavailable and that his testimony will
never be heard. That unavailability will then become a factor for the
jury to consider in reaching its verdict, and much of the effect of
defendant's superior access to proof may be negated.
The foregoing safeguards are better tailored to correct the imbalance that results from a survivor's superior access to the proof in a
wrongful death action than is a presumption of the decedent's due
care or a higher burden of persuasion as to the decedent's negligence.7 7 Thus, in the aftermath of Price v. Amdal, outright abolition
of all presumptions of a decedent's due care is appropriate. If the
Minnesota Supreme Court adopts this approach, it will both simplify
an historically complex area of the law and focus the jury's attention
where it belongs: on the actual evidence of the decedent's due care.

77. The existence of these safeguards does not, of course, mean that the problem
of unequal access to proof did not constitute a rational basis for section 602.04. See
text following note 64 supra. Although such safeguards may better resolve all of the
competing interests at stake in a wrongful death action, the legislature is entitled to
choose any method it sees fit so long as that method is rationally related to the end it
seeks to achieve. See note 61 supra. As a method for dealing with decedent unavailability, the statutory presumption was clearly not irrational.

